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Case Comment
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-RIGHT OF NEWSMEN NOT
TO REVEAL CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION TO A GRAND JURY

-The Supreme Court has held that in a grand jury setting, a newsman's
status is the same as that of any other citizen and therefore he must
respond to subpoena and answer all relevant questions relating to any
investigation into the commission of crime.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
On June 29, 1972, Earl Caldwell,1 Paul Branzburg,2 and Paul Pappas 3
had their day in court. 4 The issue, according to the majority of the Supreme Court,8 involved the obligation of reporters to respond to grand
jury subpoenas, like other citizens, and "to answer questions relevant to
an investigation into the commission of crime."" The Court held that
newsmen must appear and testify. It overturned no prior High Court
rulings, and inferred that it felt the conclusion was consistent with his7
torical first amendment interpretation.
Briefly, the impact of the Branzburg decision can be estimated by
considering its possible effect on investigative reporting in general, and
the corollary effect on the public's right to the free flow of information
and news.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE DECISION

When faced with testifying before a grand jury, the newsman is confronted with a dilemma. He may tell what he knows, thereby jeopardiz-

ing his confidential relationship with his source of information; or he
can choose to be cited for contempt and go to jail.8 Of course, any grand
1.

Los Angeles correspondent, New York Times, N.Y., N.Y.

2. Staff reporter, Courier-Journal,Louisville, Kentucky.
3. Television newsman-photographer, New Bedford, Mass.
4. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
5. Id. at 665; see id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
6.

Id. at 682.

7. "Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
... " U.S. CONsT. amend I. The question of whether a newsman has a constitutional
right not to disclose his sources of information has not been previously before the Court.
Certiorari has been denied three times in the past: Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Murphy v. Colorado, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843
(1961); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
8. This assumes that a newsman has been suppoenaed before a grand jury in a jurisdic-
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jury subpoena is subject to a motion to quash9 but Branzburg has placed
an unduly heavy burden 9 f proof upon the newsman who pursues this
line of attack. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, read the
majority opinion as holding that before a motion to quash is granted,
the reporter must show that the grand jury lacks probable cause to believe that the information sought bears more than a remote relationship
to the crime being investigated. Furthermore, he must also demonstrate
to a court that the information, if elicited, would not be of any assistance
to the grand jury.10 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart, on
the other hand, would place this weighty burden on the shoulders of
the party seeking the testimony."
There are no statistics that indicate how many members of the news
media reached some kind of compromise with the adverse side in a
grand jury setting when a reporter was faced with the choice of respond-

ing to, or ignoring, a subpoena. From all indications, the incidence of
compromise is high.' 2 However, case law in this area demonstrates that
newsmen have been willing, to exhaust their remedies and then go to
jail, if necessary, to protect their sources of information, where all attempts to compromise have failed.
tion that does not recognize his right not to disclose confidential sources of information.
As to jurisdictions providing statutory or adjudicatory protection, the -issue will be dealt
with tangentially throughout this work. This "choice" has been given much attention
recently, in the aftermath of Branzburg. See, e.g., Hume, A Chilling Effect on the Press,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 13 [hereinafter cited as Hume].
9. 408 U.S. at 708.
10. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
11. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart places the burden on the government
to show probable cause, lack of alternative means less destructive of first amendment
rights, and compelling and overriding interest. Id. at 743. The majority, by recognizing
that in pursuing the remedy of a motion to quash, the burden of proof is on the newsman,
may have all but foreclosed any chance, from the outset, of deciding the case differently
on the merits. At least, one could get this impression from the Court's overreliance and
blind faith in this single remedy. See id. at 708.
This is an appropriate time to point out that:
Freedom of the press is the constitutional presumption which can be qualified only
by a strong showing of another interest-in this case, compulsory testimony .....
Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources,
64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18, 39 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Guest & Stanzler].
12. Department of Justice Guidelines for Subpoenas to the News Media, Aug. 10, 1970
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines]; Guideline 3 states:
It is the policy of the Department to insist that negotiations with the press be
attempted in all cases in which a subpoena is contemplated. These negotiations
should attempt to accomodate the interest of the grand jury with -the interests of
the news media.
In these negotiations ... the government should make clear what its needs are in a
particular case as well as its willingness to respond. to particular problems of the news
media.
R. Cramton, Assistant Attorney General, addressing himself to this guideline, stated,
"Under the guidelines the vast majority of situations of potential conflict between the
Department and the press have been satisfactorily resolved by negotiation." Hearing on
Newsmen's Privilege Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the.Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1972) (statement of Rover Cramton) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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Any attempt to assert a common law privilege of a right to confidence
has never met with success.'8 In most cases, the courts reasoned that the
public has a right to every man's evidence. 14 Others said that there was
a common law duty to tell what one knows; still others weighed the
public interest in the smooth administration of justice against private
considerations and found little or no reason for a privilege. 15
Perhaps in reaction to the judiciary's cool reception to assertions of
a common law privilege, 0 statutes began to appear in the late nineteenth century 7 that attempted to strike a proper balance between the
public's right to an uninterrupted flow of information and the fair administration of justice.' A majority of states'9 felt, as Mr. Justice Douglas expressed in his dissent in Branzburg that "all of the 'balancing'
was done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights."2 ° At any rate the shield
statutes of an absolute nature indicate:
a legislative determination that any protection short of this broad
right to maintain the secrecy of informants' identities would sigWhether the incidence of compromise will remain high is directly related to the issue
of, what weight the guidelines will have in a court of law. To this date, in the area of
newsmen's privilege, there is no indication, one way or the other, that the guidelines will
be given the effect of law. However, if one were to analogize to other fields of administrative
law, for example, one might be encouraged by the strong tendency to give legal significance
to such things as guidelines and executive orders.
13. See, e.g., Matter of Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475 (1914); People ex rel. Mooney
v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). See also 8 J. WIGMOE,
:EVIDENCE § 2286 (3d ed. 1961); Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 18, 20, 26, 29; 9 DuQ. L.
REv. 506, 508-09 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Matter of Wayne, 4 Hawaii Dist. Ct. 475, 477 (1914).
15. See id. Additionally, an interesting analysis of this area is found in Beaver,
The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47
ORE.L. REv. 243, 246 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Beaver].
16. See 9 DuQ. L. REv. 506, 512 (1971); 38 VA. L. REv. 61, 83 (1950).
17. As .of this writing, the following statutes exist, protecting newsmen in varying
degrees from forced disclosure. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); A3ASKA STAT. §§ 9.25.150-.220
(Supp. 1970); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964);
CAL. Evm, CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 421.100 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35,
§ 2 (1971);- MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1964); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 93, § 601-2
(1964); NEV. REv. STAT. § 48.087'(1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (Supp. 1971); N.M.
SrAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970); N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1970); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.,28, § 330 (Supp. 1972).
18. Approximately three quarters of the states have shield statutes to protect a reporter's
sources absolutely. However, in only three states, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania,
are confidential sources and confidential information protected absolutely. For a more
comprehensive analysis of shield statutes see D'Alemberta, Journalists Under the Axe:
Protection of Confidential Sources of Information, 6 HAav. J. LEGIs. 307 (1969). See also
Nelson, The Newsmen's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information, 24 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Nelson]. Note, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 838, 861 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Columbia Note].
19. Id.
20. 408 U.S. at 713 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Pennsylvania is a typical example. Its shield
statute reads in part:
(a) Nb person, engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general.
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nificantly impair the newsgather-informer relationship
because of
21
the uncertainties attending a qualified right.
Most of the case law that is tied into the first amendment has grown
out of jurisdictions that profess to have qualified privilege legislation
on the books and those states which have none. Additionally, the federal forum has been generous in providing adjudication which either
accepts or rejects, on first amendment grounds, a qualified privilege.
Where there is only "judge-made" law on the subject of qualified privilege, it must be kept in mind that the Supreme Court has now spoken.
As to legislation already enacted by state legislatures, or to be enacted
22
in the future, the Court upheld its validity.
The first time that a privilege was asserted under the first amendment was the 1958 case of Garland v. Torre.23 In order to be successful
circulation as defined by the laws of this Commonwealth, or any press association or
any radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for the purpose
of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required to
disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, if any
legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any court, grand jury, traverse or petit
jury, or any officer thereof, before the General Assembly or any committee thereof,
before any commission, department, or bureau of this Commonwealth, or before any
county or municipal body, officer, or committee thereof.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1972). In 1963, when a newsman was subpoenaed and
asked to produce unpublished confidential information but not the identity of the supplier,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that: 1.) the statute should be interpreted liberally
because the legislature expressed a clear intent to place the gathering of news and protection of sources higher on the list of public welfare than any public interest that might be
served by disclosure; and 2.) the words "source of any information includes documents as
well as informants." Taylor & Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). Kentucky,
on the other hand, having a statute almost identical to Pennsylvania's, construed it strictly
to uphold the right of a grand jury to obtain the testimony of Paul Branzburg as to events
witnessed personally, including identities of those persons he observed. Branzburg v. Pound,
461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
21. Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The ConstitutionalRight to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YAr L.J. 317, 321 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note]. Similar reasoning
was reflected by the majority in Branzburg:
The privilege claimed here is conditional, not absolute ....If newsmen's confidential
sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to be, the prospect of being unmasked
whenever a judge determines the situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution
to the problem. For them, it would appear that only an absolute privilege would
suffice.
408 U.S. at 702. Justice Stewart, in his dissent, answers: "Better such judgments, however
difficult, than the simplistic and stultifying absolutism adapted by the Court in denying
any force to the First Amendment in these cases." Id. at 746.
22. The Court states:
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits,
to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to
the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes
without saying, of course, that we are powerless to erect any bar to state courts responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize
a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
Id. at 706.
23. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). For an extensive discussion
on the variety of tests that the courts have used and the resulting effect of each on the
free flow of information see Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 22-23; Yale Note, supra note
21, at 322-24. See also 61 MicH.L. REv. 184 (1962).
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in a defamation suit against the Columbia Broadcasting System, Judy
Garland needed the identity of a CBS executive who allegedly made
libellous remarks to Marie Torre, a writer for the New York Herald
Tribune. Miss Torre published these remarks and subsequently refused
to answer, at a deposition, any questions relating to the identity of her
source. When the district court ordered her to divulge the name of her
source and she again refused, the court found her in contempt. This
ruling was affirmed on appeal. As to the defense of freedom of the press,
Judge Stewart (later to become Mr. Justice Stewart) observed that an
24
attempt to compel disclosure may well infringe on press freedom;
nevertheless, since the identity of the defendant's source is at the "heart"
of the plaintiff's claim, "the paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice," should prevail. 25 Miss Torre went to jail for
ten days, which in all probability, convinced her sources of other confidential communications that she could be trusted in the future.
26
This "heart of the matter" test, as it has been popularly labeled,
was an attempt by judge Stewart to strike a proper "balance" between
the first amendment and the orderly operation of the machinery of
justice. The test, however, is incomplete. Suppose that this "anonymous" CBS executive, in addition to confiding to Miss Torre, also permitted the allegedly libellous information to slip out at an office
meeting. Assume further that after the article was published, an office
employee of CBS went to Miss Garland and verified, after being promised he would not be subpoenaed, the fact that the statements were actually made. True, the identity of the person making the statement goes to
the heart of a subsequent lawsuit, for without it, no suit could be entertained. However, in this situation, it is unnecessary to subpoena the
reporter because the information is easily obtainable elsewhere. Under
Judge Stewart's "heart of the matter," test, however, the reporter is still
forced to testify, when the interests are balanced, therefore affording
27
the press no real protection from first amendment encroachment.
Using Torre as support for its decision, the Supreme Court of Hawaii,
in 1961, held that it is not a violation of the first amendment to compel
a newsman to disclose the identity of his source of information if it is
likely that the information sought is relevant to the issues being considered. 28 As in Torre, the court recognized that the reporter's constitu24. 259 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. Id. at 549.
26. See generally Notes cited in note 23 supra.
27. However, as part of a three-pronged test, the worth of the "heart of the matter"
test can be seen. See note 37 inIra.
28. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 267 P.2d 472 (1961).
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tional rights -were being infringed. 29 Nevertheless, the court felt that
the reasonable likelihood of the evidence assisting the plaintiff in her
case outweighed any first amendment rights that the reporter could
assert.3 0
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that the first amendment arguments of press
freedom and free flow of news were worthy of consideration. This in
itself was a step in the direction toward the creation of a privilege,
although each court felt, in the cases before it, the first amendment,
encroachment could be tolerated.
In sharp contrast to the apparent weakness inherent in the abovementioned tests, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit promulgated a strong law. During a time when government was flexing its
muscles, many saw the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Caldwell v.
United Statess' as a guiding light for other courts to follow.3 2 The Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that newsmen did not have to
appear or testify before a grand jury, unless the government could first
show a compelling need for his testimony which cannot be served by
alternative means.33 After balancing the loss of the grand jury's ability
29. Id. at 329, 367 P.2d at 480.
30. This has been referred to, by at least one commentator, as the "Reasonable Likelihood" test. See Yale Note, supra note 21, at 322. Unfortunately, it suffered from the same
deficiency as the "heart of the matter" test, i.e., incompleteness.
31. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. A New York Times editorial in November, 1970, was typical of the reaction of the
Fourth Estate to the Caldwell decision:
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals in San Francisco requiring the
Government to show a "compelling need" for a journalist's evidence before' ordering
him to testify in secret grand jury hearings gives new protection to essential press
freedoms that are particularly vital in times of widespread protest and -dissent.
The Ninth Circuit ruling gives realistic recognition to the public stake in keeping
informed about the plans, philosophy and activities of such revolutionary groups as
the Black Panthers through channels that go beyond propaganda statements. Access to
such information is jeopardized when these groups, inherently distrustful of the
"establishment," are made to fear that newsgatherers in whom they have confided can
be called behind locked doors and forced to turn state informer ....
N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1970, at 30, col. 1.
33. 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970). In Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358
(N.D. Cal. 1970), the district court refused to quash the subpoena; however, it did issue a
protective order stating that Caldwell did not have to answer questions concerning his
sources of information "until there has been a clear showing of a compelling and overriding national interest that cannot be served by any alternative means." The court of
appeals agreed with the terms of this privilege. See 434 F.2d at 1086. However, the court of
appeals, in an attempt to reaffirm this general principle, while at the same time extending
it to the petitioner's right not to appear, made no mention of alternative means:
I..... we hold that where-it has been shown that the public's First Amendment right
to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit to secret
Grand Jury interrogation, the Government must respond by demonstrating a compelling need for the witness's presence before judicial process properly can issue
to require attendance.'
It is unclear, to this writer, whether the court of appeals felt that the phrase "compelling
need" was to be interpreted broadly so as to include "alternative means" or whether it
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to administer justice against the "societal interest .served by freedom of
the press--the public's right to information,"34 it reasoned that the first
amendment provided a qualified privilege. Petitioner Caldwell stressed
that he was dealing with a very sensitive group, and that he could not
tell the grand jury any more than what he had already published, due
to a protective order granted by the district court,35 and, hence, the
likelihood of impact on his ability to coninue his investigative reporting would be substantial if he were made to appear.8 6 The court
answered:
[I]f this is true-and the Government apparently has not believed
it necessary to dispute it-appellant's response to the supoena would
be a barren performance-one of no benefit to the grand jury. To
destroy appellant's capacity as a news gatherer for. such a return
hardly makes sense. Since the cost to the public of excusing his
attendance is so slight, it may be said that there is here no public
interest of real substance in competition with the first amendment
freedoms that are jeopardized.
If any competing public interest is ever to arise in a case such as.
this (where first amendment liberties are threatened by mere appearance at a grand jury investigation) it will be on an occasion in
which the witness, armed with his privilege, can still serve a useful,
purpose before the grand jury.37
The court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one. 8 By stating
that "[i]t is not every news source that is as sensitive as the Black Panther
felt that, in regard to "appearance," "compelling need" without "alternative means" would
be a sufficient showing. It appears, from Judge Jameson's concurring opinion, that the court
probably intended "compelling need" to encompass the entire test promulgated by the
district court. See Yale Note, supra note 21, at 325. See also State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647,
183 N.W.2d 93 (1971) (buttresses this conclusion).
34. Nelson, supra note 18, at 672.
35. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
36. Affidavits filed with the district and circuit courts.
37. 434 F.2d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added). The Court's test laid the
groundwork for a three-pronged test urged by Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissent 'in
Branzburg:
[T]he government must (1)show that there is probable cause to believe that thenewsman has information which is clearly of law; (2) demonstrate that the information
sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less. destructive of First Amendment
rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest' in the information.
408 U.S. at 743. It was at this point in his dissenting opinion that Mr. Justice Stewart took
pains to point out that this test was not wholly inconsistent with the "heart of the matter"
test, promulgated by him in Torre, fourteen years previously:
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to provide a testimonial privilege
to a newsman called to testify at a civil trial. But the court recognized a newsman's
First Amendment right to a confidential relationship with his source and concluded:
"It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with the use of judicial process to force
a wholesale disclosure of a newspaper's confidential sources of news, nor with a case
where the identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance or materiality . ...
The question asked . . . went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim . . . (citations
omitted).
Id. at 743 n.33. See also notes 11 & 27 supra.
38. 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Party has been shown to be respecting the performance of the 'establishment' press" and the unique position that Caldwell occupied, it
severely limited the impact of the decision.
Reaction to the decision by other courts was swift and, for the most
part, uniform. Paul Branzburg asserted the constitutional argument of
press freedom, relying heavily on Caldwell. The Kentucky court found
Caldwell distinguishable and refused to follow suit. 9 Massachusetts
likewise expressed doubts concerning the soundness of the Caldwell
holding.40 It rejected any idea of a constitutional privilege to refuse to
appear and testify before a grand jury. It felt that there were sufficient
safeguards, outside the Constitution to protect the press. 41 Necessarily,
therefore, the burden of proof was still on the newsman to "establish
'42
that the grand jury inquiry is improper.
Although the constitutional right of a qualified privilege was recognized by Wisconsin in State v. Knops, 43 it was not surprising that the
court refused to apply it to the facts of the case. Knops, editor of an
underground newspaper, refused to disclose to a grand jury the sources
of information that he used in printing a story on the bombing at the
University of Wisconsin. 44 It was clear from a reading of the story that
Knops' information was critical and lives could possibly be saved if the
sources of the information were disclosed. The court admitted that its
decision would have a chilling effect on the flow of information to the
public but felt the need to protect innocent persons, in all cases, was an
45
overriding factor.
The large increase in the amount of subpoenas issued by federal
grand juries, and the noted recalcitrance of the press to comply, led to
the issuance of the Attorney General's guidelines in August, 1970.46
Idealistically, they can be looked upon as an attempt to "accomodate
the competing constitutional and social interests" between press freedom
and the orderly administration of justice. 47 However, a close look at
39. Branzburg v. Meigs, No. W. 29-71 (Ky. Jan. 22, 1971). The court felt that Caldwell
could be distinguished on two grounds: lack of evidence presented by Branzburg to show
that his appearance would tend to affect his newsman-source relationship and the lack of a
showing that the information Branzburg had was protected, thereby making an appearance
by him a futile exercise. For an analysis see Nelson, supra note 18, at 673-74.
40. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
41. Id. at 303.
42. Nelson, supra note 18, at 675.
43. 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
44. The paper was Kaleidoscope and the story was entitled "The Bombers Tell Why
and What Next .... " For an analysis see Nelson, supra note 18, at 675-76.
45. 49 Wis. 2d at 657-58, 183 N.W.2d at 99.
46. See note 13 supra.
47. Hearings, supra note 12, at 31.
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the guidelines is in order before one can make a realistic appraisal of
their effect.
DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

GUIDELINES

Basically, the first guideline acknowledges that "compulsory process
in some circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of first
amendment rights," 48 and this must, in all instances, be weighed against
the public's interest in the fair administration of justice. 49 Without
exploring the other provisions of the guidelines, one thing is immediately apparent. The Attorney General, who occupies what can be
fairly characterized as an adversary position, has decided that he shall be
50
the one to hold the scales when this balancing is done.
The guidelines go on to provide for the seeking of information by
"reasonable" alternative means before resorting to subpoena. 51 Whether
the word "reasonable" refers to all methods that are "less destructive of
first amendment rights" 52 is unclear. 5 The guidelines, as worded, give
no indication how far the government will go in the process of independent investigation before they will abandon such a route and request a subpoena. After all, it may cost thousands of dollars to embroil
the FBI or another security organization in an investigation that could
be considered worthless when compared with the cost, in dollars, of
bringing a newsman before the grand jury. Further on, the guidelines
restate the principle of using alternative means:
C. The government should have unsucessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative non-press sources. 54
As can be seen, the word "reasonable" is missing from the above
principle. Whether this connotes an intention on the part of the govern48. Guidelines, supra note 12 (first provision).
49. Id.
50. This inherent weakness, i.e., one of the two conflicting parties formulating "guides"
and setting itself up as the ultimate arbitor, would be equally applicable to the American
press, if they had decided to take the initiative. In effect, this was accomplished by the
American Newspaper Guild in 1934, when they gave notice to the government that the
Guild considered its members ethically bound not to disclose sources of information. See
generally Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 29.
51. Guidelines, supra note 12 (second provision).
52. 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Louisiana ex rel Gremillion v.
NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
53. The Assistant Attorney General states flatly that no subpoena will be sought unless
"the information is not available from non-press sources." See note 47 supra. If this is the
case, one questions the noticeable lack of pursuing alternative means before issuing a
subpoena in the Caldwell instance. See 408 U.S. at 749 n.40 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
54. Guidelines, supra note 12 (fifth provision, section C).
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ment to exhaust all remedies, no matter what the "pocketbook" cost,
is, again, a matter of interpretation.55
The next two guidelines establish a negotiation procedure, in which
both sides air their views.50 In addition, they emphatically divest anyone
but the Attorney General of the power to request subpoenas.
The fifth and final guideline is the most important. In much detail,
it outlines the principles which shall control the Attorney General's
decision either to request or not to request the issuance of a subpoena.
A "de facto" qualified privilege emerges from this provision. 5 7 The government must show that independent evidence warrants the belief that
a crime has occurred. Secondly, there must be sufficient cause to believe
that the reporter has within his possession, essential information that
goes to the crux of the claim of guilt or innocence. Furthermore, all
attempts to obtain the information from other sources must have been
unsuccessful before the press, as a source, will be considered. Thus,
there are elements of the "heart of the matter" test,58 probable cause,
compelling need, and the exhaustion of alternative means.5 9 Unlike
55. See note 53 supra.
56. Guidelines, supra note 12 (third & fourth provisions).
57. The fifth provision reads:
In requesting the Attorney General's authorization for a subpoena, the following principles will apply:
A. There should be sufficient reason to believe that a crime has occurred, from disclosures by. non-press sources. The Department does not approve of utilizing the press
as a spring board for investigation.
B. There should be sufficient reason to believe that the information sought is essential
to the successful investigation particularly with reference to directly establishing guilt
or innocence. The subpoena should not be used to obtain peripheral, non-essential or
speculative information.
C. The government should have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information
from alternative non-press sources.
D. Authorization requests for subpoenas should normally be limited to the verification of published information and to such surrounding circumstances as relate to the
accuracy of the published information.
E. Great caution should be observed in requesting subpoena authorization by the Attorney General for unpublished information, or where an orthodox First Amendment
defense is raised or where a serious claim of confidentiality is alleged.
F. Even subpoena authorization requests for publicly disclosed information should
be treated with care because, for example, cameramen have recently been subjected to
harassment on the grounds that their photographs will become available to the government.
G. In any event, subpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material information regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably limited period
of time, and should avoid requiring production of a large volume of unpublished
material. They should give reasonable and timely notice of the demand for documents.
There are general rules designed to cover the great majority of cases. It must always
be remembered that emergencies and other unusual situations may develop where a
subpoena request to the Attorney General may be submitted which does not exactly
conform to these guidelines.
Guidelines, supra note 12.
58. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
59. See 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the qualified privilege espoused by the dissenters in Branzburg,however,
the scope and extent of the privilege granted by the Attorney General
is severely limited in two respects. First, the final paragraph of the fifth
section contains a "savings clause" which all but defeats the alleged
intent of the guidelines to accommodate both the interests of the government and the press. 60 Because the Attorney General has the final "say"
on a request, it follows that their application can be discriminatory.
By its terms, the "savings clause" is subjective and prone to different
61
interpretation by different people.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, as guidelines promulgated
by the Department of Justice, they lack legal efficacy and finality. 62 As
noted, there can be no guarantee of uniform application when the
Attorney General does not have to answer to any judicial body concerning his interpretation of the guidelines and similarly, there can be
no permanence when administrations and "attorneys general come and
go." 6 8 It is no answer to respond to this argument by noting that a
statutory privilege is also subject to non-uniform application, since, at
the very least, judges are bound to administer justice within the four
corners of the statute, their digressions being subject to judicial review.
Additionally, it is axiomatic that there are situations in which the
government will not be involved. The guidelines provide no assistance
64
in the area of private litigation.
60. See note 57 supra (final clause). Also, consider this exchange of views between Representative Kastemneier and Assistant Attorney General Cramton:
Mr. Kastenmeier: I would think that that paragraph would not give you a very good
feeling of security about what might happen, whether we are in an emergency or not
in an emergency.
Mr. Cramton: I can understand that this qualification, put in out of bureaucratic
caution, would tend to give rise to some concern. On the other hand, I do not
know of a single instance in which there has been such an emergency or a
departure from the guidelines since they have gone into effect in August of 1970.
Mr. Kastenmeier: This subcommittee had a measure before the last year, involving
the repeal of title II of the Internal Security Act. It has been argued that the Federal
Government had not, in recent years, had recourse to putting people into detention
camps. Nonetheless, Congress felt that it was desirable to remove the legal possibility
of such an act, partially to allay fear among American citizens. Doubtless we shall hear
from the news gatherers, that while guidelines do exist something more is needed by
way of reassurance.
Hearings, supra note 12, at 35.
61. See note 57 supra.
62. Robert Finchberg, Chairman, Freedom of Information Committee, American Society of Newspaper Editors, appearing before House Subcommittee No. 3, states, "[A]ttorneysgeneral come and go. The guidelines do not have the force of law and they could be modified, limited and abandoned at any time." Hearings, supra note 12, at 50. See also Yale
Note, supra note 21, at 323-24.
63. Hearings,supra note 12, at 50.
64. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).

667

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 11: 657, 1973

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

The court, in examining statutory law, prior adjudication and the
Attorney General's guidelines, when it decided to pass on the matter of
a newsman's constitutional right not to divulge confidential sources of
information to a grand jury,6 5 had three options open.66 Initially, it
could have established an absolute privilege. Alternatively, some form
of qualified privilege could have been promulgated. Finally, the Court
could have rejected the first amendment argument. It rejected any
privilege on its belief that an absolute or qualified privilege would
unduly hamper the administration of justice, and at the same time,
equally infringe upon the free flow of information.
The Court's holding on the first amendment issue is straightforward:
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding
that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news gathering which is
said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens,
respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid
grand jury investigation or criminal trial.61
This writer does not question the importance of the grand jury. What
is questioned, however, is the balancing of the role of the grand jury
against the burden on news gathering in order to arrive at a holding
so absolute in nature. If it be conceded that the two public rights which
are involved here, i.e., the public's right to the free and uninterrupted
flow of information, and its right to "everyman's evidence," are always
going to conflict in the area of forced disclosure of confidential sources
and information, it follows that an absolute rejection of a privilege is
inappropriate.6 8 While the free flow of news is a general precept, not
65. See generally 408 U.S. at 665-707.
66. Of course, initially the Court could have denied certiorari, but this was just not
possible when the ideological make-up of the Court is considered in the timely nature of
the issue and the great divisions of opinion throughout various jurisdictions. See generally
Barron, Does the Public Have a Right to Everyman's Evidence or Should Newsmen be

Exempt, 1 STUDENT LAw. 8 (No. 4, Dec. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Barron].
67. 408 U.S. at 690-91. Although mention is made to "criminal trials," the import of the
decision seems to extend only to the grand jury setting, since, in the cases before the
Court, the right to compel the appearance or testimony of newsmen in front of a grand jury
was solely at issue. The Court states:
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation
into the commission of crime.
Id.

at 682.

68. The majority continuously refers to balancing the right of the press to gather news
against the right of the public to every man's evidence (fair administration of justice).
However, it is the position of most experts that it is not "news gathering" that rests on
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subject to ad hoc considerations save in the interest of national security,"9
the policy of compulsory disclosure and the public's interest in the grand
jury's function concerning the fair administration of justice, on the
other hand, would seem to vary with the circumstances. The Supreme
Court has historically balanced first amendment interests "in each
particular case." 70 Depending on the circumstances, the public interest
may be inhibited, rather than promoted, by applying absolute standards
as the Court requires. 71 In those states that have heretofore required
circumstantial evaluation, there is no evidence that the system has
2
suffered.7
The Court refused to consider granting a qualified privilege, circumscribed by the requirement of compelling need, because of the
inherent difficulty in applying such a rule.73 Furthermore, it reasoned
that any possible deleterious effect on an informant's willingness to
disclose to a newsman confidential information would be the same
whether a qualified privilege was granted or withheld. 74 In support of
this argument, it excerpts a portion from a recent law review article.75
Unlike the Court, however, the writer of that article was attempting to
support an argument for an absolute privilege at the grand jury level.
When the Court rejects any notion of a privilege, the deterrent effect
cannot be anything but far reaching. Newsmen and informants are
told that they can never assume that disclosure will be subject to
protection. In fact, a conclusive presumption is created; a rule of law is
laid down that the newsman and the informant will forever be subject
to grand jury scrutiny. Conversely, the presumption, when dealing with
a qualified privilege, is in favor of the newsman not having to disclose
his source of information unless and until certain things can be proven.
Unquestionably, there shall be some deterrence by placing into the
one side but the "public right to know." Such things as the first amendment right to
gather news and the right of his source to remain confidential "are subsumed under [this]
broad societal interest protected by the First Amendment." 408 U.S. at 726, n.2 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); see Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 28, 37; Yale Note, supra note 21, at 317,
343. See generally Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1965) (Douglas, J. concurring); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 279-80 (1964) (issue of protection of societal
rights as the ultimate objective of court adjudication). Additionally, for an interesting
analysis of this trend see Nelson, supra note 18, at 680-81.
69. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 203
U.S. 697 (1931).
70. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950); Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 37, citing Rosenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
71. Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 37.
72. Id. at 38.
73. 408 U.S. at 702-03.
74. Id. at 702.
75. Id. at 702-03 n.39.
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hands of individual judges the right to appraise, on an ad hoc basis, the
claim of privilege. Equally certain, however, is the conclusion that this
deterrent effect will be miniscule in comparison to that which shall now
78
assuredly flow from the Court's holding.
The difficulty in delineating the term "newsman" .or in attempting to
draw guidelines of a nondiscriminatory nature is real but hardly insurmountable. 77 Thus far, seventeen states have been able to establish workable definitions.7 8 Similarly, the Supreme Court could have formulated
79
a definition that would have easily satisfied all competing interests.
As to the Court's argument that the creation of "sham newspapers"
may become a problem, 0 suffice it. to say that statutes have been care-fully drawn in this area that appear to have effectively delimited their
application. What may remain, in rare instances, is a requirement of a
court "to make some delicate judgments" of a factual nature,8 ' but, in
any event,, this hardly militates for an absolute rejection of any first
82
amendment privilege.
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE DECISION: ANALYSIS

Basically, proponents of a qualified or absolute privilege trace the
first amendment argument as follows: the first amendment implies that
a certain source of news, specifically the informant, has a right to be
-protected, since he is part of the "news gathering" process; consequently,
the right to protect these sources of information for the public good
emerges, since, if the source is not protected, the flow of news to the
public will be severely impaired. 3 Now that the Supreme Court has
denied the existence ofa-constitutional right of privilege, the issues of
sources "drying up" takes on new significance.
The flow of news to the public in a state such as Pennsylvania, which
recognizes a newsman's- privilege may have once been compatible
76. See note 21 supra.
77. 408 U.S. at 704. See also Yale Note, supra note 21, at 365 (rule promulgated which
is similar to that contained in most privilege statutes).
78. See note 17 supra. Pennsylvania, for example, limits the privilege to a person:
... engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation
as defined by the laws of this Commonwealth, or any press association or any radio or
television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for the purpose of gathering,
procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1972).
79. See generally Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 40, 41 (discussions of workable definitions and conflicting interests); Yale Note, supra note 21, at 365.
80. 408 U.S. at 705 n.40.
81. Id. at 745 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 732-33. See also Barron, supra note 66, at 10; Yale Note, supra note 21, at
326-38.
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with that of a state such as Oregon, which has never accepted the notion
of press privilege.8 4 However, with the advent of the Branzburgdecision,
this cannot continue. Branzburghas successfully foreclosed any judicial
determination that the first amendment should protect a newsman from
disclosing his sources of information. Prior' to this decision, the argu:ment could always have been made that a state court had misconstrued
tihe Constitution at sometime in the past. Whereas the first amendment
could have been relied on to provide a healthy battleground in a state
that has never considered the issue, it can no longer provide the framework for litigation. Future surveys, therefore, should show a marked
disparity between those jurisdictions which have privilege legislation
and those that have none.
Of course, it will remain impossible to survey the informants themselves.8 5 But it is only logical to assume that sources are going to be less
loquacious. In the past, informants could gauge whether or not to
divulge information to a reporter depending on what the courts around
him were forcing the reporter' to disclose."6 Presently, however, it is a
foregone conclusion that if the subject matter is important enough to
merit a grand jury probe, a reporter and his notes will-be subpoenaed.
The reaction of informants, therefore, is highly predictable.
Even the majority opinion recognized that the "argument that the
flow of news will be diminished by compelling reporters to aid the grand
jury in a criminal investigation is not irrational . . .

;"87

nevertheless

it goes on to state that "[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of such
subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosures to
'8 8
newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative."
This statement fails to take into account the inevitable impact of the
Court's own holding that newsmen must now appear and testify, whereas
in the past, it was, for the most part, an open question.
The frequency of newsmen being called to testify will now increase
drastically, thereby further inhibiting the newsman-informant relation84. See Beaver, supra note 15, at 251-52. See also Comment, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 184, 185
n.3 (1962). Oregon's most recent rejection of a constitutional privilege for newsmen came
in State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
85. 408 U.S. at 694. See also id. at 735-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. Contrary to the position taken by some commentators, primarily Beaver, informants
are aware of changes in the law and the flow of important news is directly related to their
willingness to talk with reporters. See Hume, supra note 8, at 78-79 (remarks of Earl Caldwell, Jack Anderson & Jack Nelson). See also Yale Note, supra note 21, at 330-34 (factual
and empirical analysis that conclusively rebuts Beaver's premise).
87. 408 U.S. at 693.
88. Id. at 693-94. It should be noted that this concept is much less speculative than
the Court's indulgent hypothetical situation -"sham newspapers." See id. at 705 n.40.
See also Yale Note, supra note 21, at 330-34.
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ship. Previously, newsmen usually escaped from testifying because
courts and prosecutors, mindful of the role of the press in the American
scheme, were willing to forgo the issuance of a subpoena after negotiation with the newsman, i.e., after discovering how much light a reporter
was willing to shed on the issue at hand.89 With Branzburg removing
any bargaining power that once existed, there is little to prevent a
district attorney from requesting the issuance of a subpoena indiscriminately.
Likewise, this writer must agree with the two dissents in Branzburg
concerning the likelihood of grand jury proceedings becoming more
frequent, resulting in a large percentage of "fishing expeditions." 90
Although the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell 9' leads one to
believe that a grand jury should be wary of declaring "open season"
on reporters, there is little in the majority opinion to suggest that "a
meaningful 'probable cause' requirement" should be applied before
92
subpoenaing a newsman.
From the above, it is evident that the fear of newsmen becoming
prosecutorial arms of the state is real and cannot be easily avoided. 93
The traditional role of the American press may have been weakened
beyond repair by this decision,9 4 for it appears that not only did the
court succeed in cutting off news and information at its source, but it
possibly has frightened a sufficient number of editors and investigative
reporters into "burying" stories rather than risk the arm of subpoena. 95
Regardless of who decides that a story will not be aired, the informant,
deciding not to give his information to the newsman, or the newsman,
deciding the risk to his source outweighs the writing of the story,
it is the public that will ultimately suffer. By forcing the newsman
to disclose the source of his information in a grand jury probe in one
area of interest, the Court has in all probability foreclosed any chance
of a similar story ever being uncovered and disclosed by the press at some
future time in some other area of public interest.9 6 This, in turn,
results in a hinderance, rather than an aid, to the administration of
97
justice, the paramount concern of the majority.
89. See note 12 supra. See also Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 48.
90. 408 U.S. at 719 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 744 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 744 n.34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 725.
94. Id. at 723-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 724.
96. Id. at 746 Stewart, J.,dissenting).
97. Id. Mr. Justice Stewart recognizes this all too clearly, referring to it as the "sad
paradox of the Court's opinion."
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The question of whether Branzburg will be extended beyond the
point of grand jury inquiry is basically rhetorical. The Court selected
the strongest facet of the adjudicatory process which carried with it the
strongest arguments for the creation of a constitutional privilege-the
grand jury-and rejected any notion that a constitutional privilege does
or should exist. Therefore, the chances of any type of privilege attaching
to criminal or civil trials has been effectively foreclosed.
The grand jury has, in the past, been singled out by commentators
98
who have argued for some form of testimonial privilege for newsmen.
Most refer to the grand jury's historically broad scope. 99 Its broadness
stems from the fact that it is not bound by strict rules of evidence. °°
Additionally, it possesses a general investigatory right, as opposed to
the restriction of investigating specific conduct or specific individuals. 10 '
These aspects strengthen the argument for an absolute or qualified
privilege at the grand jury level. Furthermore, it should be noted that
anyone who enters the grand jury room, enters without the benefit of
counsel at his side.
On the other hand, in a criminal trial, if a defendant requires
the
name of a newsman's informant, there are stronger reasons supporting
disclosure, mainly the defendant's sixth amendment right. 0 2 Likewise,
in a civil context, the law of defamation, it can be argued, would be
decimated by insulating the press from process when it is the press itself
that is being sued. 03 Both of these arguments should be examined more
closely, however, because of the plethora of federal legislation that has
04
been proposed in lieu of the holding in Branzburg.
A criminal defendant cannot compel the government to disclose the
identity of an informant unless the defendant can demonstrate to the
court that the identity is a crucial element of his defense. 0 5 The justification for this privilege is the public interest in effective law enforce98. See, e.g., Columbia Note, supra note 18, at 862; Yale Note, supra note 21, at 348-49.
99. Yale Note, supra note 21, at 348, citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). See also
Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590 (1961).
100. Yale Note, supra note 21, at 348.
101. Id.
102. For an interesting discussion that points up possible fifth amendment problems
as well as infringement of a defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process see
Columbia Note, supra note 18, at 862-63. See also Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 50-51.
103. See Columbia Note, supra note 18, at 862.
104. At least twenty bills were introduced by the time Subcommittee No. 3, Committee
on the Judiciary, met to consider the impact of Branzburg and proposed legislation on the
subject of newsmen's privilege. The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary, has heard testimony on a least thirteen bills as of this writing.
See Hearings, supra note 12, at 79-80.
105. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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ment.106 Similarly, the public interest in the free flow of news should be
sufficient to require some showing by a defendant of compelling need
before a newsman could be required to disclose the identity of his
source. 0 7 If a prosecutor desires a newsman's testimony, a similar test
should be applied, since there are policy considerations that strongly
militate against freeing an accused because of the obstinance of a third
10s
party.
Realistically, the only time that the press can be sued civilly in its
official capacity is for defamation. Words that relate to public officials,
public figures, or matters of public concern 09 must be shown to have
been published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard
of whether they were false." 0 This test, first applied in the landmark
decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"' has, for the most part,
insulated the press from liability for defamation in order to protect
the "free flow of news" to the public." 2
There are instances, however, where the newsman publishes material
that leads to a lawsuit between two private litigants. 1 8 Suddenly, one
of the parties feels that he cannot make out a case or defense unless the
newsman can be forced to disclose more information or the identity of
his source. Applying the same test as has been promulgated for the
criminal trial, the newsman should not be forced to disclose anything
until a plaintiff or defendant can show compelling need for the information that overrides any first amendment infringement on press freedom
14
and the public's right to know.
106. Id. at 59.
107. If the defendant can show such a need, his sixth amendment right would necessarily outweigh any first amendment interest that the newsman might claim. This is consistent with the dictates of Roviaro, that held that the right of an individual to property
prepare his defense is not absolute, but, in this type of situation, is subject to being balanced against "the public interest in protecting the flow of information." Id. at 62. See
generally Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11, at 36, 50-51.
108. Society, it can be said, has as much of a stake in sending a dangerous person to
jail as it does in setting an innocent man free. Therefore, in my opinion, to draw a distinction between a defendant's right and a prosecutor's right to a newsman information
cannot be supported to any appreciable extent. But see Guest & Stanzler, supra note 11,
at 50-51; Columbia Note, supra note 18, at 863.
109. See Rosenbloom v.Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (matters of public concern);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figures); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials).
110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
111. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
112. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967). For a proposed resolution that would
not further decimate the law of defamation see Yale Note, supra note 21, at 364.
113. See, e.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
114. The burden should be much greater in a civil trial because of the lack of a forceful counterbalance-the public's interest in protecting private litigants in their pursuit
of a money judgment. But see Columbia Note, supra note 18, at 863, citing 8 J. WiGMoRE,
EvIDENca § 2192 (3d ed. 1961).
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The above considerations, it appears, will not be controlling when the,
matter of extending the privilege beyond the grand jury is finally litigated, since the argument for the constitutional privilege at the grand
jury level .is morepersuasive than a similar argument for a trial-level
privilege. The Court has already decided to reject the stronger argument.
THE LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE

Legislation presently on the books is, for the most part, insufficient
to cope with the problems which are sure to arise in the future. Kentucky's shield law was twisted in order to cope with the grand jury's
interest in Paul Branzburg."15 Peter Bridge, a newsman, was jailed for
contempt under the guise of falling outside the penumbra of the New
Jersey "absolute" shield law. Similarly, the California shield law 1 was
held not to apply to William Farr, a reporter who printed material
concerning the Manson trial, which he obtained through an inside,
81
Court"toconfidential source. 117 Ten years ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme
19 Although
law.
shield
its
of
scope
absolute
the
on
refused to budge
day it is possible that the Pennsylvania statute would be given the same
interpretation, it is unlikely because of the Supreme Court's holding
that other interests, primarily the administration of justice, override
any first amendment considerations. At the very least, this notion will
have an impact on the state court's interpretation of its own legislative
history.
The bills currently being considered by the Congress, run the gamut
from weak and qualified to strong and absolute. 20 Paralleling state
115. See note 20 supra.
116. CAL. EVED. CoDE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966).
117. Farr has been released, by Mr. Justice Douglas, from serving his indefinite "sentence" pending the outcome of a decision of whether habeas corpus was properly denied
by the district court which refused to consider the reporter's claim that the California
statute of limitations in the criminal contempt area should be applied to his civil contempt
conviction. Farr v. Pitchess, 93 S. Ct. 573 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1973).
118. Taylor & Selby Appeals, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963). See also note 20 supra.
119. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1972).
120. For an example of the latter type, consider the following bill, introduced by_ Representative Waldie on July 20, 1972:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That a person connected with or employed by the
news media or press cannot be required by a court, the legislature, or any administrative body, to disclose before the Congress or any other Federal court or agency, any
information or the source of any information procurred for publication or broadcast.
H.R. 15972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 15972]. Note, however,
that this bill does not attempt to protect newsmen who are subpoenaed before state agendes or courts. Hence, by some, the bill could be considered qualified in nature, even
though it extends absolute protection within the dimensions of the federal sphere.
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statutes, most of the proposed legislation extends beyond the grand
jury to the courts. 1 1 If one considers constitutional conflicts which
will arise because of the all-encompassing nature of proposed legislation,
the legislation itself becomes constitutionally suspect. 12 Therefore, the
Congress might give the courts an opportunity to strike down all
previously enacted shield legislation by innocently passing a law that
ignores all other amendments but the first.
Thus, Congress should act diligently to pass a decisively formulated
shield law, keeping in mind the constitutional rights of those who will
eventually require,in the rare instance of overriding need, information
of the type that the statute is generally designed to protect. If this can
123
be done through an extremely narrowly drawn qualified privilege,
all the better; if not, the only answer may be the creation of an absolute
privilege. Whether such a statute could withstand constitutional attack
appears uncertain, considering the presently "divided" court. If it does
not, however, perhaps the Court, in holding the statute unconstitutional, would at least supply some guidelines within which the Congress
could constructively devise fruitful legislation.
CONCLUSION

From all indications, the Branzburg decision has dealt a severe blow
to investigative reporting. Thus, it follows that the public will not be
served to the fullest extent possible. The press informant, for the most
part, will now be unwilling to disclose to newsmen important information that the public should receive. Therefore, the newsman will hopefully confront the dilemma as a challenge. Until meaningful legislation
can be passed, the public's right to an uninterrupted flow of information
will depend upon the newsman's steadfast refusal to divulge his sources,
even if it means an indefinite jail sentence. Only then will the source
feel secure enough to emerge from his place of hiding and assume again,
a significant role in helping to present important news to the public.
RONALD CARL WEINGRAD
121. Compare, H.R. 15972, supra note 120, with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1972).
122. See pp. 674-75 supra.
123. Representative Whalen, in H.R. 16527, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), proposes to create
a qualified privilege that is restrictive of first amendment rights only after a clear and convincing showing, by the party seeking disclosure, of relevance and probable cause, lack of
alternative means, and compelling national interest. It, therefore, is identical with the test
promulgated by the dissent in Branzburg, set forth at note 37 supra. For this reason alone,
if the Whalen Bill becomes law, it stands a good possibility of passing constitutional muster.
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